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AGE DISCRIMINATION IN THE AIRLINE
INDUSTRY: IS AGE A BONA FIDE
OCCUPATIONAL QUALIFICATION FOR
THE POSITION OF PILOT?
CHERYL HAMMOND RAPER
0 NE HUNDRED and eighty-five surviving passengers
of United Airline's Flight 232 should be thankful that
the tragic crash in Sioux City, Iowa on July 19, 1989, did
not occur two years later. Fifty-eight year old Alfred
Haynes, the flight's captain, will be forced to retire in
.1991 due to Federal Aviation Administration regulations.'
Haynes is widely credited with saving the lives of these
passengers because of his ability to remain calm in an ex-
tremely stressful situation. His confidence and nerves of
steel were supplemented and strengthened by thirty-three
years of flying experience. 2 Once he retires, a younger
and potentially less experienced pilot will assume the cap-
taincy position.
One has to wonder what would have happened to Flight
I FAA Age Sixty Rule, 14 C.F.R. § 121.383(c) (1989); see infra notes 100-109
and accompanying text for a discussion of the FAA Age Sixty Rule.
2The Dallas Morning News, July 26, 1989, at 10A, col. 1; see also The Dallas
Morning News, July 21, 1989, at IA, col. 1. Although the total number of years a
person has been piloting is a relevant safety consideration, the amount of time a
pilot has spent flying a particular model of airplane will obviously also affect his
ability to competently fly that model. Thus, flying experience involves not only
total amount of flying time but also total amount of flying time in a particular
model of airplane. As a result, at least one airline has decided not to schedule a
pilot as captain unless he has had at least 100 hours of flying experience on the
particular type of plane that he will be captaining. See Low Time Crews, THE SAFETY
MIND: DELTA MEC SAFETY NEWSLETrER, Third Quarter 1989, at 4 (newsletter from
Delta's Central Air Safety Committee notifying the airline's pilots of the change in
scheduling requirements).
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232's survivors had a pilot without Haynes' experience
been in control of the airplane. The fate of Continental
Flight 1713, which crashed on takeoff after an inexperi-
enced crew decided to depart amidst a heavy snow and ice
storm, is just one example of the tragedies that can result
from a lack of experience.3 Many lives were lost, includ-
ing those of Flight 1713's pilots, due to an error in judg-
ment which might have been alleviated if the pilots had
more piloting experience before being promoted to the
head cockpit positions.4 Experience comes with time,
however, and unfortunately people age over time. As a
result of FAA regulations and the stereotypical infirmities
that come with age, many airlines systematically discrimi-
nate against older pilots when making employment deci-
sions, with the frequent result that a relatively
inexperienced pilot is promoted to captain.
This comment will discuss the effect of age discrimina-
tion in the selection and retention of airline pilots. The
first section will begin by addressing the background of
age discrimination and its effect on both the particular vic-
tim and society as a whole.' This section will also discuss
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 6 which em-
bodies Congress' response to the mounting concern
about age discrimination.7 The second section contains a
discussion of the Bona Fide Occupational Qualification
exception to the Act's general prohibition against age dis-
Kantrowitz, Cohn, Junkin, Gibney & Carroll, Too Green to Fly?, NEWSWEEK,
Nov. 30, 1987, at 32.
- Id. at 32-33. Both pilots had just recently been promoted to their positions.
Id. at 32. The captain had only 165 flight hours as a DC-9 co-pilot before his
promotion. Id. The co-pilot had only 36 1/2 hours as a jet pilot before the fatal
crash. Id.
See infra notes 11-27 and accompanying text for a discussion of age discrimi-
nation and its effects.
6 Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1982 & Supp. V
1987) [hereinafter ADEA]. The ADEA includes a broad prohibition of discrimina-
tion on the basis of age in employment, labor organizations, and employment
agencies. Id. § 623.
7 See infra notes 28-47 and accompanying text for a discussion of Congress' en-
actment of the ADEA.
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crimination.8 The last section will address the particular
8 ADEA, supra note 6, § 623(a)-(c), (f). Section 623 includes, in part, the follow-
ing provisions:
(a) Employer practices - It shall be unlawful for an employer
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or
otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of em-
ployment, because of such individual's age;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of em-
ployment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his sta-
tus as an employee, because of such individual's age; or
(3) to reduce the wage rate of any employee in order to comply
with this chapter.
(b) Employment agency practices - It shall be unlawful for an em-
ployment agency to fail or refuse to refer for employment, or
otherwise to discriminate against, any individual because of such
individual's age, or to classify or refer for employment any indi-
vidual on the basis of such individual's age.
(c) Labor organization practices - It shall be unlawful for a labor
organization -
(1) to exclude or to expel from its membership, or otherwise to
discriminate against, any individual because of his age;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify its membership, or to classify
or fail or refuse to refer for employment any individual, in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individ-
ual of employment opportunities, or would limit such em-
ployment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee or as an applicant for employment,
because of such individual's age;
(3) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate
against an individual in violation of this section.
(f) Lawful practices . .. - It shall not be unlawful for an employer,
employment agency, or labor organization -
(1) to take any action otherwise prohibited under subsection (a),
(b), or (c) . . . of this section where age is a bonafide occupa-
tional qualification reasonably necessary to the normal opera-
tion of the particular business, or where the differentiation is
based on reasonable factors other than age, or where such
practices involve an employee in a workplace in a foreign
country, and compliance with'such subsections would cause
such employer, or a corporation controlled by such em-
ployer, to violate the laws of the country in which such work-
place is located;
(2) to observe the terms of a bona fide seniority system or any
bona fide employee benefit plan such as a retirement, pen-
sion, or insurance plan, which is not a subterfuge to evade
the purposes of this chapter, except that no such employee
benefit plan shall excuse the failure to hire any individual,
and no such seniority system or employee benefit plan shall
require or permit the involuntary retirement of any individ-
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concerns of the airline industry in adopting its age-related
hiring policies, 9 and the judiciary's reactions to the imple-
mentation of these policies.' °
I. THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT
A. Background
Age discrimination can take many forms and affect a
wide variety of persons. After all, everyone has an "age."
Consequently, age discrimination can actually mean dis-
crimination against anyone because of his or her particu-
lar age, regardless of whether they are young or old."
This article, however, will be limited to a discussion of age
discrimination in situations where a worker has been con-
sidered too old for employment, rather than too young.
This type of age discrimination in the work place can
obviously have a crippling effect on both the individual
employee and the national economy, especially when it is
experienced in the form of mandatory retirement.' 2 Forc-
ing a productive employee to retire usually results in a
drastic and unwanted change in lifestyle. The legal di-
lemma concerns the extent to which such discrimination
ual specified by section 631 (a) of this title because of the age
of such individual; or
(3) to discharge or otherwise discipline an individual for good
cause.
Id. (emphasis added); see infra notes 48-86 for a discussion of the bona fide occu-
pational qualification (BFOQ).
9 See infra notes 88-109 and accompanying text for a discussion of the unique
aspects of the airline industry that affect the BFOQ determination.
10 See infra notes 110-156 and accompanying text for a discussion of judicial
treatment of the airlines' attempts to use the BFOQ defense as a justification for
age discrimination.
1 L. FRIEDMAN, YOUR TIME WILL COME: THE LAW OF AGE DISCRIMINATION AND
MANDATORY RETIREMENT 5 (1984). Friedman notes that age discrimination can
mean "discrimination against anybody because of age, regardless of what that age
might be - 12, 40, 80 or 100." Id. It is historically hard to find any defined
political movements encouraging laws on age discrimination. Id. Despite this, the
elderly have fairly recently become an identifiable interest group and, conse-
quently, there is an increasingly prevalent relationship between this group and the
developing law on age discrimination. Id. at 6.
12 See generally id. at 73-79 for a discussion of mandatory retirement, which many
scholars feel is the essence of age discrimination.
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will be tolerated. In making this decision, an examination
of the various effects of age discrimination on the em-
ployee and society is helpful.
Age discrimination in employment generally places the
greatest burden on the recipient of the discrimination.' 3
The individual worker who is victimized by discriminatory
practices often suffers losses in both his economic and so-
cial status.' 4 In addition, the victim of age discrimination
may incur psychological and health costs as a result of his
forced leisure.' 5 These losses are necessarily exacerbated
when a person who was fired because of his increasing age
is See 113 CONG. REC. 34,743-44 (1967). During Congressional debates over
the ADEA, supporters of the Act emphasized President Johnson's conclusion that
"the greater loss [from arbitrary age discrimination] is the cruel sacrifice in happi-
ness and well-being which joblessness imposes on these citizens and their fami-
lies." Id. at 34,744. But see C. EDELMAN & I. SIEGLER, FEDERAL AGE
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT LAW: SLOWING DOWN THE GOLD WATCH (1978).
Edelman and Siegler note that although arbitrary age discrimination engenders
many problems, not all persons who are forced to retire feel burdened. Id. at 1.
In attempting to draft laws prohibiting age discrimination, these persons should
be considered
because any solution to the problem of age discrimination in em-
ployment which prevents or discourages the withdrawal of such per-
sons from the regular labor force at an appropriate time must be
assiduously avoided if the solution to one problem is not to create
another one both for persons [who are not burdened by job sever-
ance] and for those others who would enter into or advance within
the labor force upon the retirees' withdrawal.
Id. Consequently, the authors seem to indicate that age discrimination is not an
inherently burdensome concept, but becomes burdensome only in the manner in
which it has generally been practiced by employers.
14 PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, LAW OF THE ELDERLY 169 (1977) (noting that age
discrimination results in the displaced worker experiencing "losses in income, sta-
tus, and social orientation").
15 Id. at 170 (concluding that "forced leisure is, for many, an unsatisfactory re-
placement for meaningful employment"); see also Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347
U.S. 442 (1954). In Barsky, Justice Douglas stressed the general importance of the
right to employment for the individual:
The American ideal was stated by Emerson in his essay on Politics,
"A man has a right to be employed, to be trusted, to be loved, to be
revered." It does many men little good to stay alive and free and
propertied, if they cannot work. To work means to. eat. It also
means to live. For many it would be better to work in jail, than to sit
idle on the curb. The great values of freedom are in the opportuni-
ties afforded man to press to new horizons, to pit his strength
against the forces of nature, to match skills with his fellow man.
Id. at 472 (dissenting opinion).
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cannot find alternative employment. The problem is es-
pecially troubling when new employment is refused solely
on the basis of age.
Although the individual worker generally feels the dras-
tic effects of age discrimination directly,' 6 society as a
whole also becomes burdened.' 7 As a result of the dis-
placement of these workers, society loses the benefits of
potentially productive citizens and instead is forced to
make expenditures for programs designed to support
them. 8 This is especially disconcerting because the
group affected by this type of discrimination is steadily
growing, both in "absolute numbers and as a percentage
of the total population."' 9 Even if one ignores society's
desire to protect the victims' social and physical well-be-
16 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
17 In the Congressional debates on the ADEA it was noted that on January 23,
1967, in a Special Message to the Congress Proposing Programs for Older Ameri-
cans, President Johnson stated that:
Today more than three-quarters of a billion dollars in unemploy-
ment insurance is paid each year to workers who are 45 or over ....
In 1965, the Secretary of Labor reported to the Congress and the
President that approximately half of all private job openings were
barred to applicants over 55; a quarter were closed to applicants
over 45.
In economic terms, this is a serious - and senseless - loss to a
nation on the move.
113 CONG. REC. 34,744 (1967). Additionally, in urging Congress to adopt amend-
ments to the ADEA that would make it applicable to federal and state employers,
President Nixon stated that "discrimination based on age is cruel and self-defeat-
ing; it destroys the spirit of those who want to work and it denies the National [sic]
the contribution they could make if they were working." H.R. REP. No. 913, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 40, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2811, 2849.
Is PRACTISING LAw INSTITUTE, supra note 14, at 170-71 (footnotes omitted).
, C. EDELMAN & I. SIEGLER, supra note 13, at 11. Additionally, the third chapter
of this book contains some enlightening information about the historically in-
creasing numbers in the elderly population:
In 1776, the population of the United States was approximately 2.5
million, life expectancy at birth was 38-39 years and the number of
individuals aged 65 and older was 50,000 or about 2 percent of the
total. By 1900 there were 3 million older people or about 4 percent
of the total population and in mid-1975 there were 22.4 million
older people or about 10 percent of the total .... [L]ife expectancy,
calculated for individuals born in 1974 is 68.9 years for men and
72.4 years for women.... This gain in life expectancy has been ac-
complished by advances in medical care, primarily at the younger
ages by reductions in infant mortality. It has been estimated that the
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ing, increased growth of the elderly population and con-
tinued age discrimination could have a staggering effect
on social security, unemployment, and welfare pro-
grams.2 ° Permitting age discrimination to go unchecked
could result in massive increases in the amount of ex-
penditures necessary to fulfill the perceived goals of these
programs. Consequently, the effects of age discrimina-
tion are not only felt by the individual victim, but must
also be endured by society in general.
Recognizing the extensive effects of age discrimination
and the various burdens it caused, Congress began to
consider the need for regulation in this area.2 1 While con-
sidering legislation that ultimately became Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964,22 Congress discussed the possi-
bility of prohibiting age discrimination. 23 For various rea-
sons, however, Congress decided not to include such a
prohibition in the 1964 Civil Rights Act.24 Instead, the
average life expectancy would naturally peak somewhere around 90
years of age.
Id. at 11-12 (footnotes omitted).
20 See PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 14, at 171 (quoting Hearings on the
Economics of Aging Before the Subcommittee on Employment & Retirement Incomes of the
Senate Special Committee on Aging, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1317 (1969)), indicating that
supporting those unemployed due to age discrimination leads to extensive in-
creases in both public and private expenditures. Public expenditures are in-
creased in the areas of government programs for the elderly, poor, and
unemployed. Id. Private expenditures are generally increased in the areas of pri-
vate pensions and contributions from the family. Id.
21 See C. EDELMAN & I. SIEGLER, supra note 13, at 69-71 (discussing Congress'
progression toward regulating the area of age discrimination); see also J. KRAus-
KOPF, ADVOCACY FOR THE AGING 223 (1983) (noting that Congress passed the
ADEA "[i]n response to the problems of unemployment and premature forced
retirement of the older worker").
22 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). Title VII generally
concerns discrimination in employment based on "race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin." Id. § 2000e-2.
23 See C. EDELMAN & I. SIEGLER, supra note 13, at 69 (noting that the suggestion
was made to include age discrimination as prohibited conduct in the Civil Rights
Act of 1964); see alsoJ. KALET, AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT LAw 1 (1986)
(noting that efforts were made to include age as a protected class under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act).
24 See C. EDELMAN & I. SIEGLER, supra note 13, at 69 ("the proposal [to prohibit
age discrimination in the 1964 Civil Rights Act] was rejected in an effort to assure
passage without delay of a statute covering the other types of discrimination, par-
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Civil Rights Act included a request by Congress for the
Secretary of Labor to make a report on age discrimination
in employment and to include recommendations for legis-
lation to prevent arbitrary age discrimination in employ-
ment.25 The report that followed noted that many
employers persistently set arbitrary age limits in their hir-
ing practices that had no relation to the ability or skill nec-
essary to perform the particular job available.26 The
Secretary of Labor concluded that "elimination of arbi-
trary age limits in employment will proceed much more
rapidly if the federal government declares clearly and un-
equivocally, and implements so far as is practicable, a na-
tional policy with respect to hiring on the basis of ability
rather than age. "27 Thus, the Secretary of Labor paved
the way for Congress to legislate in the area of age dis-
crimination in employment.
B. Analysis of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) 28
represented Congress' response to the report made by
the Secretary of Labor and the increasing concerns that
were articulated concerning the subject of age discrimina-
ticularly racial discrimination"); L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 14 (although the
cause was good, 'the timing [was] bad' ").
2-, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-14 (1982). The Secretary of Labor was to make recom-
mendations for legislation to prevent arbitrary age discrimination which he be-
lieved were advisable. Prevention of Discrimination Because of Age, 89th Cong., 2d
Sess., reprinted in 80 Stat. 845 (1966); see alsoJ. KALET, supra note 23, at 1 (indicat-
ing that the inclusion of this request of the Secretary of Labor to make a report on
age discrimination was a compromise between those Congressmen who had
wanted a prohibition of age discrimination included in the 1964 Civil Rights Act
and those who did not want such a provision in that particular piece of
legislation).
26 C. EDELMAN & I. SIEGLER, supra note 13, at 70 (citing REPORT OF THE SECRE-
TARY OF LABOR TO THE CONGRESS UNDER SECTION 715 OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF
1964, The Older American Worker - Age Discrimination in Employment (June 1965)).
The report noted that there "is persistent and widespread use of age limits in
hiring that in a great many cases can be attributed only to arbitrary discrimination
against older workers on the basis of age and regardless of ability." Id.
27 See id. For a discussion of the Secretary of Labor's findings, see Note, The Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 90 HARV. L. REV. 380, 383-84 (1976).
28 ADEA, supra note 6, §§ 621-634; see also supra note 8 and accompanying text
for the text of some of the ADEA's provisions.
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tion in employment. 29 Based on an extensive set of Con-
gressional findings on the harmful effects of arbitrary age
discrimination in employment, 30 the Act stated that its
purpose was "to promote employment of older persons
based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary
age discrimination in employment; [and] to help employ-
ers and workers to find ways of meeting problems arising
from the impact of age on employment."'3 In interpret-
ing the ADEA, courts have emphasized that it is a reme-
dial statute which prohibits a subtle form of
discrimination and have consequently relied on the Act's
humanitarian purposes in concluding that Congress in-
tended it to be given a broad scope. 2
29 See supra notes 17 & 25-27 and accompanying text for the concerns expressed
about age discrimination; see also Vazquez v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 579 F.2d 107,
109 (1st Cir. 1978) (noting that "[tihe insidious effects of being barred at the door
of the employment market were recognized as undermining one's self-esteem in a
work-oriented society," and that Congress enacted the ADEA based on this
realization).
3o ADEA, supra note 6, § 621 (a). This section states the Congressional findings
that:
(1) in the face of rising productivity and affluence, older workers
find themselves disadvantaged in their efforts to retain employ-
ment, and especially to regain employment when displaced from
jobs;
(2) the setting of arbitrary age limits regardless of potential for job
performance has become a common practice, and certain other-
wise desirable practices may work to the disadvantage of older
persons;
(3) the incidence of unemployment, especially long-term unemploy-
ment with resultant deterioration of skill, morale, and employer
acceptability is, relative to the younger ages, high among older
workers; their numbers are great and growing; and their em-
ployment problems grave;
(4) the existence in industries affecting commerce, of arbitrary dis-
crimination in employment because of age, burdens commerce
and the free flow of goods in commerce.
Id.
Id. § 621 (b); see also Polstorffv. Fletcher, 452 F. Supp. 17, 23 (N.D. Ala. 1978)
(in which the court stated that "the purpose of the ADEA was to alleviate serious
economic and psychological suffering of persons within this age range, caused by
unreasonable prejudice and job discrimination").
32 Hall v. United States, 436 F. Supp. 505, 509 (D. Minn. 1977) (noting that
"[tihe ADEA is a remedial statute which 'prohibits a particularly subtle form of
discrimination, and the courts must be receptive to its purposes and accord it the
intended scope' "); see also Vazquez, 579 F.2d at 109 (recognizing that "[iun line
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The ADEA combats the increasing and devastating
problem of age discrimination by establishing broad
prohibitions against discriminatory practices in the work
place. 3 First, an employer cannot use age as a basis for
discharging or refusing to hire someone, nor can he con-
sider age as a factor in establishing or changing an em-
ployee's compensation and terms of employment. 4
Second, an employer is precluded from segregating or
classifying his employees in any manner which would de-
prive them of employment opportunities merely because
of the employee's age.3 5 Finally, an employer is prohib-
ited from reducing an employee's wages in an attempt to
comply with the Act.36 As defined by the Act, an employer
includes anyone in an industry affecting commerce who
has at least twenty employees per working day in each of
twenty or more weeks of the present or immediately past
calendar year. 7 The word "employer" also encompasses
any agent of such a person, a state or political subdivision
thereof, or any agency or instrumentality of a state and
any interstate agency.3 8
with the broad humanitarian goals of the statute, liberal construction should be
favored," and that "[a]ny interpretation should strive to further a substantial goal
of the Act"); Surrisi v. Conwed Corp., 510 F.2d 1088, 1090 (8th Cir. 1975) (stat-
ing that the ADEA is a remedial statute to be given broad scope); Gazder v. Air
India, 574 F. Supp. 134, 136 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (in interpreting the ADEA, courts
must seek. to effectuate and not interfere with the Act's humanitarian goals).
, ADEA, supra note 6, § 623(a)-(c); see supra note 8 for the entire text of these
provisions.
34 ADEA, supra note 6, § 623(a)(1). This subsection makes it unlawful for an
employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, con-
ditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age." Id.
,5 Id. § 623(a)(2). This subsection makes it unlawful for an employer "to limit,
segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive or tend to
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect
his status as an employee, because of such individual's age." Id.
sr, Id. § 623(a)(3). This subsection states that it is unlawful for an employer "to
reduce the wage rate of any employee in order to comply with this chapter." Id.
,7 Id. at § 630(b). This subsection provides that "employer means any person
engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has twenty or more employees for
each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or
preceding calendar year." Id.
3" Id.
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The effects of the ADEA are not solely limited to em-
ployers. The Act also makes it unlawful for an employ-
ment agency to discriminate on the basis of age in
accepting, classifying, or referring applicants for potential
jobs.39 Labor organizations are also affected by the Act in
that it precludes them from segregating or excluding from
membership any individual on the basis of his age. 40 The
ADEA also makes it unlawful for a labor organization to
cause an employer to discriminate against an individual
on the basis of his age.4 '
As originally enacted, the ADEA prohibited these dis-
criminatory practices against workers who were between
the ages of forty and sixty-five years of age.42 The Act was
later 'amended to include an upper age limit of seventy
years of age.43 In 1986, however, the upper age limit was
completely withdrawn, and the application of the Act's
prohibitions is now limited to individuals who are at least
forty years of age.44
- Id. § 623(b). This subsection states that "[i]t shall be unlawful for an employ-
ment agency to fail or refuse to refer for employment, or otherwise to discrimi-
nate against, any individual because of such individual's age, or to classify or refer
for employment any individual on the basis of such individual's age." Id.
40 Id. § 623(c)(1), (2). These subsections provide that it is unlawful for a labor
organization
(1) to exclude or to expel from its membership, or otherwise to dis-
criminate against, any individual because of his age;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify its membership, or to classify or
fail or refuse to refer for employment any individual, in any way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of em-
ployment opportunities, or would limit such employment oppor-
tunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee
or as an applicant for employment, because of such individual's
age[.]
Id.
I Id. § 623(c)(3). This subsection provides that it is unlawful for a labor organ-
ization "to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an indi-
vidual in violation of this section." Id.
4 Age Discrimination In Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, § 12, 81
Stat. 602 (1967) (prior to 1978 and 1986 amendments).
4- Age Discrimination In Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-256, § 3(a), 92 Stat. 189 (1978) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 631 (1982)).
44 ADEA, supra note 6, § 631(a) (Supp. V 1987) (providing that "the prohibi-
tions in this chapter ... shall be limited to individuals who are at least 40 years of
age").
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A person who believes he has been discriminated
against on the basis of his age can make out a prima facie
case by showing "blatant and overt discriminatory acts by
the employer." 45 The alleged victim may carry this burden
by exhibiting (1) that he was within the statutorily pro-
tected age group; (2) that he is able and qualified to do
the job; (3) that he was discharged or treated adversely;
and (4) that the employer sought to replace him with a
younger person or gave benefits to a younger person.4 6
Once a prima facie case has been made, the employer has
the burden either to justify the age discrimination or to
show that the discharge or. failure to hire was based on
reasonable factors other than age.47
The ADEA evidences Congress' attempt to combat the
45 J. KRAUSKOPF, supra note 21, at 231.
46 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). McDonnell involved
a situation in which a black civil rights activist had engaged in disruptive and ille-
gal activity in protesting his discharge from employment. Id. at 794. The activist
and others had stalled their cars on the main road leading to the employer's plant,
blocking access to the plant during a shift change. Id. When the employer re-
jected his re-employment application, the activist filed a complaint with the
EEOC, alleging a violation of Title VII. Id. at 796. The Court established that, in
order to recover under the 1964 Civil Rights Act articulated in Title VII, the com-
plainant has
the initial burden under the statute of establishing a prima facie case
of racial discrimination. This may be done by showing (i) that he
belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for
a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, de-
spite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejec-
tion, the position remained open and the employer continued to
seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications.
Id. at 802. The Court concluded that the activist had proved a prima facie case of
discrimination, but that the employer had successfully overcome this showing by
demonstrating that it had discharged the activist for his participation in unlawful
conduct directed against the employer. Id. at 802-03. The Court remanded the
case, however, to give the activist a fair opportunity to show that the employer's
stated reason for rejecting his re-employment application was a pretext. Id. at
804. Many courts have applied the McDonnell prima facie test to age discrimina-
tion cases under the ADEA. SeeJ. KRAUSKOPF, supra note 21, at 231; see infra notes
60-81 and accompanying text for a discussion of the manner in which Title VII
proof requirements have been applied to age discrimination cases.
47 Bittar v. Air Canada, 512 F.2d 582, 582-83 (5th Cir. 1975) (upon a prima
facie showing of age discrimination by plaintiff, the burden of going forward with
evidence shifts to the employer, but the burden of proving a case of age discrimi-
nation by a preponderance of the evidence remains with the plaintiff).
COMMENTS
increasingly drastic effects of age discrimination on indi-
vidual workers and society. The purposes and goals of
the Act exhibit Congress' concern about increasing re-
ports of the arbitrary displacement of competent and pro-
ductive older workers. When enacting the ADEA,
however, Congress did realize that, in some situations,
age could be considered an important factor in hiring due
to the particular characteristics of certain jobs. In these
instances, an employer may be justified in refusing to hire
a job applicant or firing a current employee because of his
age. Thus, if age is an important factor in determining
one's abilities as a pilot, then a pilot may have additional
problems in obtaining recovery, despite his ability to
demonstrate a prima facie case of age discrimination.
II. THE BONA FIDE OCCUPATIONAL QUALIFICATION
EXCEPTION
A. Background
Despite the drastic effects age discrimination has on so-
ciety and individual victims, employers have often at-
tempted to assert various justifications for firing or
refusing to hire elderly employees.48 Many employers
consider older employees to be less efficient, more acci-
dent prone, and more inflexible and resistant to change
than younger employees.49 Despite the zealous advoca-
tion of the employers' assertions, their attempted justifi-
cations usually lack any factual basis.5 °
Nevertheless, Congress created some exceptions to the
general prohibition against age discrimination contained
48 See generally Kovarsky & Kovarsky, Economic, Medical and Legal Aspects of the Age
Discrimination Laws in Employment, 27 VAND. L. REv. 839, 844-65 (1974) (including a
list of reasons employers often give for discriminating on the basis of age and
finding that these excuses are on the whole factually unsupportable).
49 C. EDELMAN & I. SIEGLER, supra note 13, at 18-19. The authors conducted a
study of older workers in the work place with specific emphasis on the areas in
which employers generally attempted to justify age discrimination. They con-
cluded that these alleged justifications were largely unfounded. Id.
so See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
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in the ADEA. 5" In doing this, Congress attempted to bal-
ance the ideals articulated in the Act with the practical re-
alization that a person's age could be reasonably related
to his ability to perform in ce'rtain positions. 52 Conse-
quently, the Act states that it is not unlawful for an
employer
to take any action otherwise prohibited.., where age is a
bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to
the normal operation of the particular business, or where
the differentiation is based on reasonable factors other
than age, or where such practices involve an employee in a
work place in a foreign country, and compliance ... would
cause such employer, or a corporation controlled by such
employer, to violate the laws of the country in which such
work place is located[.] 53
Thus, an employer may discriminate on the basis of age
where he can prove that age is a bona fide occupational
qualification (BFOQ) reasonably necessary to the normal
operation of the particular business.
This may be a rather difficult task, however, as courts
.' ADEA, supra note 6, § 623(0 (1985); see also C. EDELMAN & I. SIEGLER, supra
note 13, at 97 (in a section devoted to lawful practices under the ADEA, the au-
thors note that the "ADEA recognizes that not all refusals to hire or terminations
of older persons represent instances of age discrimination in employment").
52 Hodgson v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 4 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 7795, 4
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 728, 730 (S.D. Fla. 1972) (concluding that "Congress
has sought to temper the ideals embodied in the Act with the practical knowledge
that differentiation based on age is reasonably necessary to the normal operation
of some particular business[es] or to specific positions within some businesses"),
aff'd, 531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976).
-3 ADEA, supra note 6, § 623(0(1) (emphasis added). The ADEA also makes it
lawful for an employer
(2) to observe the terms of a bona fide seniority system or any bona
fide employee benefit plan such as a retirement, pension, or in-
surance plan, which is not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of
[the Act], except that no such employee benefit plan shall excuse
the failure to hire any individual, and no such seniority system of
employee benefit plan shall require or permit the involuntary re-
tirement of any individual specified by section 631 (a) of this title
because of the age of such individual; or
(3) to discharge or otherwise discipline an individual for good
cause.
Id. § 623(0(2), (3).
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have repeatedly held that the goals of the Act and the seri-
ous ramifications of abuse require that the BFOQ excep-
tion be narrowly interpreted.5 4  This is especially true
considering the fact that both the Department of Labor
and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the
two federal agencies that have been responsible for en-
forcement of the ADEA, consistently advocate an ex-
tremely narrow interpretation of the BFOQdefense.5 5 An
additional problem with the BFOQ exception is that the
Act does not articulate any criteria to evaluate in deter-
mining what is reasonably necessary to the normal opera-
tion of the particular business. 6 This has naturally meant
that the subject has remained open to judicial interpreta-
tion on a case-by-case basis.5 7
54 See Western Airlines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 412 (1985) (noting that
the recommendations of the Secretary of Labor and EEOC, both of whom have
consistently advocated a narrow interpretation of the BFOQ, should be followed);
EEOC v. Boeing Co., 843 F.2d 1213, 1217 n.4 (9th Cir.) (the court concluded that
"[blecause the BFOQdefense substitutes a blanket rule for individual evaluation,
it is 'an extremely narrow exception' to the statute's general principles"), cert. de-
nied, 109 S. Ct. 222 (1988);Johnson v. American Airlines, Inc., 745 F.2d 988, 991
(5th Cir. 1984) (citation omitted) (the "BFOQ defense is regarded as a narrow
exception to the general prohibition against age discrimination), cert. denied, 472
U.S. 1027 (1985); Orzel v. City of Wauwatosa Fire Dep't, 697 F.2d 743, 748 (7th
Cir.) (citations omitted) ("courts have consistently held that the BFOQ exception
to the ADEA is to be interpreted narrowly..."), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 992 (1983);
EEOC v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Bd., 565 F. Supp. 520, 522 (E.D. Pa. 1983)
(citing Orzel, 697 F.2d at 748) (the goals of the ADEA "counsel against an expan-
sive interpretation of the BFOQ defense").
- See 29 C.F.R. § 1625.6 (1988) (the Department of Labor states that the
BFOQ exception "will have a limited scope and application"); see also Orzel, 697
F.2d at 748. The court noted that:
both the Department of Labor, the federal agency originally en-
trusted with the enforcement of the ADEA, and the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission, to whom enforcement
responsibilities were transferred in 1979, have consistently advo-
cated an extremely narrow interpretation of the BFOQ defense.
Such an interpretation by the agencies charged with enforcement of
the ADEA is, of course, entitled to considerable weight.
Id. (citations omitted).
56 PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 14, at 192 n.124.
57 See Western Airlines, 472 U.S. at 411 (noting that "[tihe diverse employment
situations in various industries ... forced Congress to adopt a 'case-by-case basis
... as the underlying rule in administration of the legislation' "); Boeing, 843 F.2d
at 1216-17 n.4 (an "[ilndividualized case-by-case evaluation of each employee is
the underlying principle of administration under [the] ADEA").
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B. Application
The BFOQ exception is an affirmative defense to a
claim of age discrimination, and as such, the employer has
the burden of proving that it is applicable.58 Because of
the lack of guidelines contained in the Act itself for deter-
mining when a certain age may be reasonably necessary
for a particular business, it was unclear exactly what the
employer must prove. Consequently, many courts have
dealt with this question in detail. 59
1. Standard Borrowed from Title VII Discrimination Cases
In determining the requirements for establishing a
BFOQ defense, courts have often relied by analogy on
tests articulated in discrimination cases falling under
5" See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 122-25 (1985) (rec-
ognizing that the BFOQ is a defense to an age discrimination claim, but holding
that the employer had not shown that it was applicable); Monroe v. United Air-
lines, Inc., 736 F.2d 394, 400 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding that the airline employer
had the burden of proving the BFOQ affirmative defense), cert. denied, 470 U.S.
1004 (1985); Orzel v. City of Wauwatosa Fire Dep't, 697 F.2d 743, 753 (7th Cir.)
(requiring that the employer show the requirements of a BFOQ defense), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 992 (1983); Smallwood v. United Airlines, Inc., 661 F.2d 303, 307
(4th Cir. 1981) ("to justify a refusal to hire under the BFOQ exception contained
in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the burden is on the employer
... "); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1625.6(b) (1988). Section 1625.6(b) of Title 29 of the
Code of Federal Regulations states that:
An employer asserting a BFOQ defense has the burden of proving
that (1) the age limit is reasonably necessary to the essence of the
business, and either (2) that all or substantially all individuals ex-
cluded from the job involved are in fact disqualified, or (3) that some
of the individuals so excluded possess a disqualifying trait that can-
not be ascertained except by reference to age.
Id.
5 See generally Mahoney v. Trabucco, 738 F.2d 35, 38-39, 42 (1st Cir.) (holding
that an employer must establish that age is a BFOQ for the well recognized occu-
pation within a particular business and not just for the particular business itself),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1036 (1984); Orzel, 697 F.2d at 753 (employer must satisfy a
two-pronged test in order to establish a BFOQ defense to an age discrimination
claim); Tuohy v. Ford Motor Co., 675 F.2d 842, 844 (6th Cir. 1982) (when an
employer is trying to establish a BFOQ on the basis of "the safety of the persons
other than the one claiming discrimination, a particular inquiry into the effect of
aging on the ability to perform safely is called for"); EEOC v. Pennsylvania Liquor
Control Bd., 565 F. Supp. 520, 522 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (citation omitted) (to "suc-
cessfully invoke the BFOQ defense, an employer must demonstrate that the chal-
lenged policy is related to the duties of the particular job").
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prohibitions of the Civil Rights Act in Title VII.60 Hodgson
v. Greyhound Lines, Inc. 6 ' involved an interstate bus com-
pany engaged in a practice of refusing to hire new drivers
who were thirty-five years of age or older.62 Greyhound
asserted that age was a BFOQ because hiring new drivers
over the age of thirty-five did not give the company
enough time to train them properly, and incomplete train-
ing combined with the degeneration of abilities that oc-
curs with age would seriously affect passenger safety.63
In reversing the decision of the district court that the
BFOQ defense was not applicable, 64 the Seventh Circuit
adopted the test set forth in Diaz v. Pan American World Air-
ways, Inc. ,65 a Title VII action.66 The Seventh Circuit con-
cluded in Greyhound that:
Greyhound must demonstrate that it has a rational basis in
fact to believe that elimination of its maximum hiring age
will increase the likelihood of risk of harm to its passen-
gers. Greyhound need only demonstrate, however, a mini-
mal increase in risk of harm for it is enough to show that
elimination of the hiring policy might jeopardize the life of
one more person than might otherwise occur under the
present hiring practice.67
(emphasis added) The court believed that Greyhound
had met this burden by establishing that the essence of its
6 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-12 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). The Civil Rights
Act of 1964 deals, in part, with employment discrimination on the basis of "race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin". Id. § 2000e-2(a); see supra notes 23-25
and accompanying text for a discussion regarding the decision not to include age
discrimination among the types of discrimination prohibited in the 1964 Civil
Rights Act.
6 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975).
62 Id. at 860.
6 Id. at 863.
6 The district court decision is reported at 354 F. Supp. 230 (N.D, Ill. 1973).
65 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971). The court in Diaz
interpreted the ADEA's language requiring that a BFOQ be "reasonably neces-
sary to the normal operation of that particular business" to mean that, in order to
be eligible for using the defense, an employer must show that the essence of the
business operation would be undermined by hiring persons within the class pro-
tected by the statute. Id. at 388.
66 Greyhound, 499 F.2d at 862.
67 Id. at 863 (emphasis added).
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operations-the safe transportation of passengers-would
be undermined by hiring people over the age of thirty-
five.68
Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc. 69 presented the Fifth
Circuit with similar facts, and although it agreed with the
Seventh Circuit's decision on the merits in Greyhound, it
disagreed with that court's articulation of the appropriate
test to be used in establishing a BFOQ defense y0  The
Fifth Circuit concluded that, in addition to demonstrating
that the Diaz "essence of operations" test was met, an em-
ployer attempting to invoke the BFOQ defense must also
demonstrate that a second test, articulated in Weeks v.
Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. ,' was satisfied y2
The Weeks case established that an employer must show
either that it had a reasonable cause for believing that all
or substantially all of the members of the affected class
would be unable to perform the job safely or effectively,
or that it would be impossible or highly impractical to
deal with the class members on an individual basis.
The Seventh Circuit 'had concluded in Greyhound that
the Weeks and Diaz tests were inconsistent. 74 The Fifth
Circuit, however, rejected any inconsistency and stated
that the Diaz test was merely an affirmation and elabora-
tion of the Weeks rationale.7 5 According to the Fifth Cir-
"' Id. at 865. This decision has been criticized because it "frustrates congres-
sional intent, as expressed in the enactment of the ADEA, by permitting arbitrary
and unreasonable age discrimination through an overly broad application of the
BFOQ exception." C. EDELMAN & I. SIEGLER, supra note 13, at 104 n.98 (quoting
XVI B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 688, 691 (1975)).
- 531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976).
70 Id. at 235.
71 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
72 Usery, 531 F.2d at 235-37. The Usery court went on to apply both tests. Id.
7-1 Weeks, 408 F.2d at 235 & n.7. For a discussion on the requirements of and
the differences between the Weeks and Diaz tests, see Tuohy v. Ford Motor Co.,
675 F.2d 842, 844 (6th Cir. 1982).
74 Greyhound, 499 F.2d at 861-62.
7,5 Usery, 531 F.2d at 235 & n.27. In rejecting the notion that the Diaz and Weeks
tests were inconsistent, the Fifth Circuit noted that:
[T]he Diaz requirement of a correlation between the job description
and the essence of the business operation is a condition precedent to
the application of Weeks' BFOQ exception to the ban on hiring dis-
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cuit, the application of the BFOQ exception test
articulated in Weeks must be preceded by a Diaz determi-
nation that a correlation exists between the job descrip-
tion and the essence of the business' operations. 6 Thus,
the Fifth Circuit concluded that the court in Greyhound had
misinterpreted, albeit harmlessly, the appropriate test for
establishing a BFOQ defense by failing to recognize the
Weeks aspect of the test.
Despite this conclusion, the Seventh Circuit later inter-
preted the Greyhound decision as supporting the two-
pronged test used in Usery for establishing a BFOQ de-
fense.77 In Orzel v. City of Wauwatosa Fire Department,78 the
court stated that Greyhound was consistent "with the ap-
proach taken by virtually every other circuit that has ad-
dressed the scope of the BFOQ exception. ' 79 The court
concluded that this approach meant that:
[I]n order to prevail on a BFOQ defense, an employer
must show that the challenged age qualification is reason-
ably related to the "essential operation" of its business,
and must demonstrate either that there is a factual basis for
believing that all or substantially all persons above the age
limit would be unable to effectively perform the duties of
the job, or that it is impossible or impracticable to deter-
mine job fitness on an individualized basis."0
This approach, originally developed by the Fifth Circuit
and followed by other courts, has also been adopted by
crimination. As such, Diaz affirms and elaborates on the Weeks ra-
tionale . . . . [Diaz] represented an evolution of Weeks to cover
attempts by employers to discriminate on the basis of job descrip-
tions not related to the essence of the employer's business.
Id.
I7 Id.
7 Orzel v. City of Wauwatosa Fire Dep't, 697 F.2d 743, 753 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 992 (1983).
78 Id.
71 Id.; see also Mahoney v. Trabucco, 738 F.2d 35, 37 (1st Cir.) (adopting the
standard enunciated in Orzel), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1036 (1984); Smallwood v.
United Airlines, Inc., 661 F.2d 303, 307 (4th Cir. 1981) (in order to establish a
BFOQdefense the employer must meet a two-pronged test).
mo Orzel, 697 F.2d at 753 (footnote omitted).
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the Supreme Court in Western Airlines, Inc. v. Criswell.8'
Thus, the standard for establishing a BFOQ defense to a
claim of age discrimination has been determined.
2. Additional Factors in Establishing a BFOQ
Courts consider a variety of additional factors when
evaluating whether a particular employer has met the
standard adapted from the Title VII decisions. Many
courts have held that the applicability of the BFOQ de-
fense depends not only on the employer's essence of op-
erations but also on his ability to show that the age policy
is "related to the duties of the particular job. '8 2 In fulfil-
ling this requirement, the employer "may not rely upon
'stereo-typical notions or hunches;' rather, it must adduce
an 'empirical justification' for its age limit."' 83 Thus, the
mere allegation that safety concerns are part of the es-
sence of the employer's operations is insufficient to justify
discrimination based on age. The employer must also
show that age requirements for certain jobs are necessary
because of the particular duties of that job.
Additionally, Congress intended that the validity of a
BFOQ defense turn on specific factual findings, prefera-
bly by a jury.8 4 Consequently, it appears that the availabil-
ity of a BFOQ defense will necessarily depend on the
particular facts in each case. Courts have also generally
held that economic considerations cannoi be the basis for
a BFOQ defense because "precisely those considerations
"' See Western Airlines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 416-17 (1985). The De-
partment of Labor also adopted this approach as establishing the employers bur-
den of proof under a BFOQ defense. See 29 C.F.R. § 1625.6 (1988).
82 EEOC v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Bd., 565 F. Supp. 520, 522 (E.D. Pa.
1983) (citations omitted) (emphasis added); see also Trans World Airlines, Inc. v.
Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 122 (1985) ("[e]very court to consider the issue has as-
sumed that the 'particular business' to which the statute refers is the job from
which protected individual is excluded").
"3 Pennsylvania Liquor Control Bd., 565 F. Supp. at 522 (quoting Beck v. Borough
of Mannham, 505 F. Supp. 973, 975 (E.D. Pa. 1981)).
84 EEOC v. Boeing Co., 843 F.2d 1213, 1216 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
222 (1988).
were among the targets of the Act.""5 The fact that it may
be more economical to employ younger workers is there-
fore not a valid justification for age discrimination. 6
An employer who wishes to defend himself against a
claim of age discrimination must meet the two-pronged
test that the Fifth Circuit in Usery adapted from the Weeks
and Diaz Title VII decisions. Because of the broad goals
of the ADEA and the courts' reluctance to impede these
goals by giving the BFOQ an expansive interpretation,
this will definitely be a strenuous burden for the em-
ployer. The airline industry is one employer that has
been rather successful in meeting this burden.
III. THE BONA FIDE OCCUPATIONAL QUALIFICATION IN
THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY
A. Special Considerations of the Airline Industry
The airline industry is a unique employer, serving
unique needs. Unlike many employers, thousands of in-
nocent and trusting people depend on airlines every day
for safe and efficient transportation. These people as-
sume that flying is a safe form of travel, and the airline
industry's continued success is dependent on its passen-
gers' assumptions about safety in the skies. If passengers
begin to question the safety of air travel, they might
choose another means of transportation. Consequently,
like the bus company in Greyhound,"7 safety is a primary
concern for airlines.
85 Smallwood v. United Airlines, Inc., 661 F.2d 303, 307 (4th Cir. 1981). But see
Murnane v. American Airlines, Inc., 667 F.2d 98, 101 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (in
which the court stated that "an economic benefit which is merely incidental or
collateral to an otherwise perfectly valid BFOQ is not sufficient reason to declare
the same legally invalid"), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 915 (1982).
86 See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text for a discussion of employers'
alleged justifications for age discrimination, most of which have been criticized as
unfounded. This may be especially true of the commonly held belief that older
workers are less productive than younger employees.
87 Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1122 (1975); see supra notes 61-68 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of Greyhound.
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1. The Impact of the Safety Factor on an Airline's Claim That
the BFOQ Defense Is Applicable
Congress recognized the importance of safety consider-
ations in the airline industry and mandated that airlines
operate with the highest possible degree of care. 8 With
the burgeoning amount of air traffic and the possibility of
a proportionate increase in air disasters, it is no wonder
that safety concerns continue to be of the utmost impor-
tance.8 9 Because of the large number of persons currently
engaging in air travel and the extensive losses likely to be
incurred in the event of a mishap, airlines should take
great care to ensure passenger safety. Since the airlines
probably have the best ability to determine how to oper-
ate at the safest level, at least one court has concluded
that great deference should be given to an airline's deter-
mination of the safest possible standards for operation.9 °
In establishing the BFOQ defense, Congress implicitly
recognized that, in some instances, safety concerns might
weigh heavily in favor of age discrimination, despite the
drastic results of such discrimination. 9' Consequently, if
" 49 U.S.C. § 142 1(b) (Supp. V 1987). This mandate is set forth in the Federal
Aviation Act which states that "[ijn prescribing standards, rules, and regulations,
and in issuing certificates under this subchapter, the Secretary of Transportation
shall give full consideration to the duty resting upon air carriers to perform their
services with the highest possible degree of safety in the public interest .... " Id.
89 See Murnane v. American Airlines, Inc., 667 F.2d 98, 101 (D.C. Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 456 U.S. 915 (1982). The District of Columbia Circuit concluded that
"the airline industry is one in which safety is of the utmost importance," and the
"staggering death tolls and resulting human suffering which have followed some
of our nation's horrible air disasters attest to this fact." Id.
'o Id. The court decided that:
[I]n our judgment, the airline industry must be accorded great lee-
way and discretion in determining the manner in which it may be
operated most safely .... This is in accord with American's view that
"safe" is not sufficient. Rather, the "safest" possible air transporta-
tion is the ultimate goal. Courts, in our view, do not possess the
expertise with which, in a cause presenting safety as the critical ele-
ment, to supplant their judgments for those of the employer.
Id.
'" See Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224, 236 (5th Cir. 1976) (in
which the court stated that the "greater the safety factor, measured by the likeli-
hood of harm and the probable severity of that harm in case of an accident, the
more stringent may be the job qualifications designed to insure safe driving").
the essence of the business' normal operations involved
public safety, and if the employer's age requirement fur-
thered these goals, then a BFOQ might be established.92
Additionally, the Department of Labor has promulgated
certain regulations regarding the applicability of the
BFOQ defense 93 which recognize that:
[A] BFOQ defense permits federal statutory and regula-
tory compulsory retirement provisions imposed to protect
public safety without reference to the individual's ability to
perform the job. [Thus,] the government body responsi-
ble for interpreting the ADEA recognizes that a BFOQde-
fense does not have to relate solely to the employee's age
and ability to perform the job assigned.94
Public safety, therefore, has been recognized as a valid
employer concern which could justify, in appropriate cir-
cumstances, the application of the BFOQ defense to a
claim of age discrimination.
The Supreme Court has held that the two-pronged test
used by employers in establishing a BFOQ defense must
also be met by employers attempting to justify age dis-
crimination because of safety concerns. 95 The Equal Em-
For a discussion on the effects of age discrimination in employment, see supra
notes 13-20 and accompanying text.
92 See Useiy, 531 F.2d at 235 (an employer's burden may be met if it establishes
that some members of the otherwise protected class "possess a trait precluding
safe and efficient job performance that cannot be ascertained by means other than
knowledge of the applicant's membership in the class").
1,3 29 C.F.R. § 1625 (1988). Section 1625 notes that "[i]f the employer's objec-
tive in asserting a BFOQis the goal of public safety, the employer must prove that
the challenged practice does indeed effectuate that goal and that there is no ac-
ceptable alternative which would better advance it or equally advance it with less
discriminatory impact." Id. § 1625.6(b).
- Johnson v. American Airlines, Inc., 745 F.2d 988, 993 (5th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 472 U.S. 1027 (1985).
",5 Western Airlines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 416-17 (1985). The
Supreme Court stated that:
Every Court of Appeals that has confronted a BFOQ defense based
on safety considerations has analyzed the problem consistently with
the [Usery] standard. An EEOC regulation embraces the same crite-
ria. Considering the narrow language of the BFOQ exception, the
parallel treatment of such questions under Title VII, and the uni-
form application of the standard by the federal courts, the EEOC,
and Congress, we conclude that this two-part inquiry properly iden-
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ployment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) also has
concluded that this two-part test adequately accounts for
justifications of age discrimination based on public
safety. 6 Thus, mere allegations that a particular age re-
quirement furthers public safety will not lessen the bur-
den an employer must meet. 97 Consequently, an airline
employer will have to satisfy the test originally applied in
Usery in order to establish a BFOQ based on safety
concerns.
The airline's burden of proof does not end upon satis-
fying the two-pronged test, however. The EEOC fol-
lowed Congress' lead and also concluded that, in addition
to meeting that test, the employer concerned with public
safety must prove that the challenged practice furthers
that goal and that no acceptable, less discriminatory alter-
native exists to equally advance safety.98 Additionally,
due to the constant advances in medical science that could
allow for individual testing of older employees, the mere
fact that age was determined to be a "public safety based"
BFOQ in the past does not mean that it will continue to
be a BFOQ in the future.9 9 Thus, the airlines' employ-
ment practices will have to continue to evolve with the in-
creasing ability to test pilots individually for age-related
safety hazards.
2. The Federal Aviation Administration's Age Sixty Rule
The airline industry is unique in that the Federal Avia-
tifies the relevant considerations for resolving a BFOQ defense to an
age-based qualification purportedly justified by considerations of
safety.
Id.
29 C.F.R. § 1625.6 (1988); 46 Fed. Reg. 47,727 (1981).
91 Western Airlines, 472 U.S. at 416-17.
98 EEOC v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Bd., 565 F. Supp. 520, 523 (E.D. Pa.
1983) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1625.6 with approval); see supra note 93 for the partial
text of 29 C.F.R. § 1625.
' Monroe v. United Airlines, Inc., 736 F.2d 394, 405 (7th Cir. 1984) (in which
the court concluded that "a once-valid BFOQ may lose its justification with ad-
vances in medical science" and the mere fact that age "may have been a BFOQin
1978 does not place it beyond challenge now"), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1004 (1985).
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tion Administration (FAA) has promulgated a regulation
which effectively requires mandatory retirement for pilots
of large commercial aircraft. 0 This regulation, com-
monly called the "FAA Age Sixty Rule," provides that:
No certificate holder may use the services of any person as
a pilot on an airplane engaged in operations under this
part if that person has reached his 60th birthday. No per-
son may serve as a pilot on an airplane engaged in opera-
tions under this part if that person has reached his 60th
birthday.' 0'
The FAA has justified this provision on the basis that the
physical and psychological consequences of aging, and
the inability to gauge with accuracy the effects aging will
have on a particular individual, necessitate a policy of
across the board age discrimination in the interests of
public safety.' 0 2
t- FAA Age Sixty Rule, 14 C.F.R. § 121.383(c) (1989). This provision gener-
ally requires pilots to retire at the age of sixty. Id. The rules set forth in Section
121 govern the following:
(1) Each air carrier engaging in interstate or overseas air transporta-
tion under a certificate of public convenience and necessity or other
appropriate economic authority issued by the CAB. (2) Each air car-
rier engaging in foreign air transportation under a certificate of pub-
lic convenience and necessity or other appropriate economic
authority issued by the CAB. (3) Each air carrier covered by para-
graph ... (1) or (2) of this section when engaging in charter flights
or other special service operations. (4) Each supplemental air carrier
when it engages in the carriage of persons or property in air com-
merce for compensation or hire. (5) Each commercial operator when
it engages in the carriage of persons or property in air commerce for
compensation or hire - (i) With large aircraft other than airplanes;
or (ii) As a common carrier solely between places entirely within any
state of the United States, with airplanes having a seating capacity of
more than 30 passengers or a maximum payload capacity of more
than 7,500 pounds. (6) Each air carrier when it engages in all-cargo
air service under a certificate issued by the CAB under section 418 of
the Federal Aviation Act of 1958.
Id. § 121.1(a).
1o Id. § 121.383(c) (1989).
102 See 49 Fed. Reg. 14,695 (1984) (codified at 14 C.F.R. § 121) (noting that
"incapacitating medical events" and "adverse psychological, emotional, and phys-
ical changes" occur as a result of the aging process, and the "inability to detect or
predict with precision an individual's risk of sudden or subtle incapacitation, in
the face of known age-related risks, counsels against relaxation of the rule"); see
also Aman v. FAA, 856 F.2d 946, 948 (7th Cir. 1988) (the court noted that in
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The FAA regulation appears to concretely establish that
age is a BFOQ for pilots in the airline industry. The
courts, however, generally have not considered the FAA
regulation as conclusive evidence of a BFOQ 10 3 Conse-
quently, although the FAA regulation can certainly be
considered by a court in determining whether an em-
ployer is justified in discriminating on the basis of age due
to safety considerations, it does not automatically estab-
lish such a defense.
The FAA Age Sixty Rule certainly does have an impact
on an airline's hiring and retention policies. Although the
Rule does not explicitly mandate retirement, it implicitly
requires that air carrier pilots wishing to continue piloting
after the age of sixty meet certain medical requirements
and limit their piloting to non-carrier positions or accept a
demotion in cockpit position. 0 4  In promulgating the
rule, the FAA was concerned with the increased medical
problems associated with aging and the tragic effects that
would result from a medical emergency occurring during
flight. 105
defending the Age Sixty Rule at its inception, "the FAA cited concerns about sud-
den incapacitation due to strokes and heart attacks and about the ability of the
most senior pilots to operate the largest and fastest planes ...."); EEOC v. Boe-
ing Co., 843 F.2d 1213, 1215 (9th Cir.) (summarizing the findings upon which the
FAA Age Sixty Rule is based: "namely, that progressive deterioration occurs with
age; that sudden incapacity becomes significantly more frequent after age 60; that
the risk of such incapacity could not be gauged adequately except by reference to
age; and therefore that the Age-60 Rule was necessary for safety of air carriers"),
cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 222 (1988).
,03 See Western Airlines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 418 (1985). In Western
Airlines, the Supreme Court stated that:
Although the FAA's rule for pilots, adopted for safety reasons, is
relevant evidence in the airline's BFOQ defense, it is not to be ac-
corded conclusive weight. The extent to which the rule is probative
varies with the weight of the evidence supporting its safety rationale
and "the congruity between the ... occupations at issue."
Id. (citation omitted).
- 14 C.F.R. § 121.383(c) (1989); see also Aman, 856 F.2d at 948 (noting that the
FAA Age Sixty Rule means that "to remain in the cockpit air carrier pilots must
continue to meet medical certificate requirements and restrict themselves to
flights outside the coverage of Part 121 [commercial air carriers] or accept demo-
tions to positions of lesser authority, such as those of flight instructor or flight
engineer").
105 See O'Donnell v. Shaffer, 491 F.2d 59, 60 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Airlines Pilots
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Some courts have begun to question the continuing va-
lidity of and need for this rule as well as its rigid applica-
tion by the FAA. In Aman v. Federal Aviation
Administration,'0 6 the Seventh Circuit noted that potential
flight problems stemming from age may be offset by the
increased experience of older pilots.l0 7 Additionally, the
advances in medical science which would permit more
thorough individual testing may justify the revocation of
the blanket prohibition.'0 8 Thus, although the FAA has
not committed an abuse of discretion in applying the rule
without exception in the past, such an application might
become an abuse if medical technology advances to a
point where individual testing is feasible.' 0 9 The revoca-
tion of the FAA Age Sixty Rule would have a serious detri-
mental effect on the airline's ability to justify age as a
Ass'n, Int'l v. Quesada, 276 F.2d 892, 898 (2d Cir. 1960). In Quesada, the court
noted that in promulgating the Age Sixty Rule, the FAA
found that the number of commercial pilots over sixty years of age
has until recent years been very few but is increasing rapidly; that
older pilots because of their seniority under collective bargaining
agreements often fly the newest, largest, and fastest planes; that
available medical studies show that sudden incapacitation due to
heart attacks or strokes become more frequent as men approach
sixty and present medical knowledge is such that it is impossible to
predict with accuracy those individuals most likely to suffer attacks;
that a number of foreign air carriers contacted had mandatory retire-
ment ages of sixty or less; and that numerous aviation safety experts
advocated establishing a maximum age of sixty or younger.
Quesada, 276 F.2d at 898; see also supra note 102 and accompanying text for addi-
tional information about the FAA's justifications for the Age Sixty Rule.
106 856 F.2d at 946.
107 Id. at 954-57.
108 Id. at 948. Additionally, at the inception of the Age Sixty Rule in 1960 the
FAA itself noted that "medical science may at some future time develop accurate,
validly selective tests which would safely allow selected pilots to fly in air carrier
operations after age sixty." 24 Fed. Reg. 9772 (1959).
- See generally Gray v. FAA, 594 F.2d 793, 795 (10th Cir. 1979) (although the
court held that at that time, the FAA's policy of denying all exemptions' to the Age
Sixty Rule was not an abuse of discretion, it noted that "[a]t some point, the state
of the medical art may become so compellingly supportive of a capacity to deter-
mine functional age equivalents in individual cases that it would be an abuse of
discretion not to grant an exemption"); Starr v. FAA, 589 F.2d 307, 314 (7th Cir.
1978) (noting that the FAA may adhere inflexibly to the Age Sixty Rule "until it is
satisfied that medical standards can demonstrate an absence of risk factors in an
individual sufficient to warrant a more liberal application of the Age 60 Rule").
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BFOQfor the position of pilot, since the Age Sixty Rule is
based on many of the same factors the airlines use in at-
tempting to establish a BFOQ
Congress and the courts apparently have recognized
that public safety concerns can justify age discrimination
in some circumstances, and consequently age will be con-
sidered a BFOQin those instances. Despite this recogni-
tion, an employer will have to meet stringent proof
requirements in order to establish that a safety based
BFOQ is justified. An employer in the airline industry
may not rely solely on the FAA Age Sixty Rule to establish
such a defense for all aircraft employees. The courts obvi-
ously are not inclined to let an employer circumvent the
goals of the ADEA merely by alleging that safety consider-
ations dictate an age below those protected by the Act.
B. Judicial Treatment of the Airlines' BFOQ Defense
An airline attempting to assert that age is a BFOQ will
thus have to carry a burden that is at least equal to that
required of other employers. Many courts have had the
opportunity to evaluate such claims made by various air-
lines, but there have been differing results.
1. Conflict in the Lower Courts
One of the first cases to address an airline's ability to
justify age discrimination by claiming that age was a
BFOQ was Murnane v. American Airlines, Inc., "0 which was
decided by the District of Columbia Circuit in 1981. Mur-
nane, forty-three, had applied for the position of flight of-
ficer and had been turned down because of American's
policy of only hiring persons under thirty years of age for
such positions."' The position of flight officer was the
lowest of three cockpit employment levels, the other two
being co-pilot and captain.' 1 2 American's "crew-concept"
667 F.2d 98 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 915 (1982).
Id. at 99-100 (noting that "American has a general guideline against hiring
persons over the age of thirty for the beginning position of Flight Officer").
"1 Id. at 99 American's general policy was that the "position of Flight Officer is
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was that the two lower levels would be training positions
for the ultimate goal of captaincy, and all crew members
were hired with this goal in mind."t3 The entire process
of advancing among these positions took an average of
fourteen to twenty years," 14 and American did not permit
anyone to establish a permanent career in either of the
two lower positions.' 5
The court recognized that aviation accidents were
largely a result of pilot error, and that these errors de-
creased as the pilot gained experience. 11 6 Since a pilot's
experience would increase as he got older, the increased
age of a pilot was not a detriment but a benefit to
safety." 7 The problem, according to the court, was that
American's crew concept required that all pilots progress
the first of three employment levels, i.e., Flight Officer, Co-pilot, and Captain,
which ultimately leads to a captaincy in an American Cockpit". Id.
113 Id. (stating that "[ilt is American's fixed policy to require all Flight Officers
to advance to the position of Captain" and nobody "is hired by American without
this goal in mind").
114 Id. at 99 n.2 (finding that "it takes an average of fourteen to twenty years to
progress from the position of Flight Officer to that of Captain under American's
extensive training system," although conflicting evidence was presented on this
issue).
115 Id. at 99. The court found that American was consistent in its use of the
lower level positions as a training device:
This is referred to as American's "up-or-out" policy. More specifi-
cally, if a Flight Officer or Co-pilot has received the maximum
amount of training required for such position and is not qualified at
that juncture to advance to the next post, then it is American's policy
to terminate such person's employment. American's procedures do
not allow for a career as a Flight Officer or Co-pilot.
Id. (footnote omitted).
116 Id. at 100 (noting that approximately ninety percent of all aviation accidents
were a result of pilot error, and these incidents decreased with pilots who had
more experience).
1,7 Id. at 100 n.4. In affirming the district court's conclusion that age was a
BFOQ for American, the court stated that:
It is noteworthy to us that the district court did not premise his
BFOQ determination on a finding that there exists a correlation be-
tween the increased chronological age of a pilot and his or her de-
creased ability to operate an aircraft in a safe manner. On the
contrary, he concluded that an older Captain who had served in that
position for the longest possible period of time would be the safest
Captain.
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through the two lower-level crew positions before acting
as a captain."" Because of the FAA Age Sixty Rule and
the amount of time that was required to advance to the
position of captain, older flight officers would only be able
to serve as captain for a short period of time."t 9 Upon
their retirement, other pilots new to captaincy would suc-
ceed them, thus resulting in a decrease in experienced
captains. 20
Consequently, requiring American to hire older flight
officers would result in less experienced captains, and this
would jeopardize public safety.' 2' By setting an age limit
for new members of the cockpit crew, American maxi-
mized safety,' 22 and the safe transportation of passengers
was the essence of American's operations. 23 American
had thus successfully justified its age discrimination by es-
tablishing that an age lower than forty was a BFOQ for a
position as a flight officer because it resulted in exper-
ienced pilots remaining in the captaincy position for a
longer amount of time before they were required to retire
at age sixty. 124 The court then concluded that even if age
had not been established as a BFOQ, the refusal to hire
Murnane was still justified because the evidence indicated
that he was not completely qualified for the position of
118 Id. at 99 n.2.
1"9 Id. at 100. The court recognized that:
[S]ince it takes at least ten to fifteen years to progress from Flight
Officer to Co-pilot to Captain, if appellant were hired as Flight Of-
ficer in his forties he would probably not become Captain until his
late fifties. The Federal Aviation Administration itself requires re-
tirement at age 60, so that he would be able to serve only briefly as
an American Captain before he had to retire.
ld.
.20 Id. As a result, American limited "its new hiring to relatively young pilots."
Id.
121 Id. (the court concluded that the safest pilot is the one with the most experi-
ence, and "the best experience an American Captain can have is acquired by flying
American aircraft in American's three cockpit positions").
122 Id. ("by limiting its new hiring to relatively young pilots, American thereby
ensures that the experience with American of its active Captains will be maxi-
mized" and this "maximizes safety").
12 Id. at 101.
124 Id. at 100.
[55
1989] COMMENTS 573
flight officer regardless of age. 25
Ironically, seven days after Murnane was decided, the
Fourth Circuit reached almost the exact opposite conclu-
sion in Smallwood v. United Airlines, Inc. 126 United had an
aircraft crew classification system essentially identical to
that of American's in Murnane. 12 7  Smallwood, a forty-
eight year old pilot, had been refused a position as a flight
officer because of his age.' 28
United's alleged BFOQ, however, was purportedly
based on different factors than the one established by
American. In attempting to establish a BFOQ defense,
United did not use the same reasoning as American had in
Murnane. Instead, United asserted that hiring pilots over
the age of thirty-five would "disproportinately increase
the chance of medical emergencies during flight."'129 Ad-
ditionally, United argued that hiring older pilots would
adversely affect its "crew concept" by requiring it to "un-
train" pilots who had previously been with other airlines
and learned another method of aircraft operation.13 0
United contended that its three-tiered piloting system was
effective because throughout each pilot's career, he had
1'2 Id. at 101-02. The court concluded that the evidence persuasively demon-
strated that Murnane "would not have been selected during later stages of the
pilot selection process" because of "major deficiencies in both [his] judgment and
in his flying skill itself." Id. at 102. Consequently, because American proved that
Murnane would not have been hired even if it had not engaged in the allegedly
discriminatory hiring practices, Murnane was not entitled to recover. Id.
,2,6 6 1 F.2d 303 (4th Cir. 1981).
127 Id. at 305 n.2 (United classified its aircraft crew into three levels - Second
Officer, First Officer, and Captain - and a new hire would progress through each
position); see supra notes 112-115 and accompanying text for a discussion of Amer-
ican's classification system in Murnane.
128 Smallwood, 661 F.2d at 306. United's policy was that "a maximum age of 35
at hire was necessary to achieve peak productivity." Id.
129 Id.
)so Id. United had focused its testimony "[o]n the fact that there was an 'un-
training' factor to be considered when evaluating the desirability of employing
pilots with significant prior experience. It was further noted that difficulties might
arise when someone moved from a command position elsewhere to a subordinate
position with United." Id. at 306-07. Smallwood, however, discredited United's
argument by presenting "uncontradicted evidence that major air carriers find ap-
plicants with prior Navy or Air Force experience especially desirable." Id. at 307.
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only been introduced to United's way of operating.'3'
The Fourth Circuit did not believe that United had sur-
passed the two-pronged test required to establish a
BFOQ. 32  The court concluded that there was no evi-
dence to support United's claim that hiring pilots over the
age of thirty-five would impair its "crew concept."' 133
Thus, the court found that the second prong of the test
had not been met because United had not established that
substantially all pilots hired within Smallwood's age range
would not be able to perform effectively.' 34 Additionally,
the court concluded that United's medical tests were suffi-
ciently advanced to determine which of these.potential pi-
lots might cause a safety risk due to health problems in
flight. 135
Approximately one year later, the Fifth Circuit ex-
pressed its views regarding age discrimination in the air-
line industry and sided with the District of Columbia
Circuit. 36 In Johnson v. American Airlines, Inc. ,'$ the airline
did not refuse initial employment because of an appli-
I' ld. at 306. United's "crew concept" was that their pilots interacted effec-
tively because throughout their career they learned one, and only one, method of
aircraft operation - United's. Id.
132 Id. at 308. United's evidence "failed to show a relationship between a maxi-
mum age-at-hire limitation and airline safety." Id. at 309. For a discussion of the
two-pronged test required for an employer to establish a BFOQ defense to a
claim of age discrimination, see supra notes 69-81 and accompanying text.
13 Smallwood, 661 F.2d at 308 (the court essentially concluded that a BFOQ
defense was not established because the alleged harm to the cockpit crew was not
a function of age).
134 Id. The court emphasized that under "United's pilot progression policy,
Smallwood, if employed, would probably remain a Second Officer until his
mandatory retirement at age 60. It is undisputed that a significant number of
United's pilots maintain Second Officer status from hire to mandatory retire-
ment" at age sixty. Id. Consequently, it was difficult for United to establish that
all or substantially all persons within Smallwood's age range would be unable to
perform safely when it was already permitting such persons to act in that capacity.
Id.
,3. Id. at 308-09.
1-1 Johnson v. American Airlines, Inc., 745 F.2d 988 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
472 U.S. 1027 (1985). The court recognized the two apparently conflicting deci-
sions in Smallwood and Murnane, but concluded that Murnane was the better deci-
sion because the Smallwood court relied on authority that did not involve the
BFOQdefense. Id. at 991-92, 993 n.3.
1-7 745 F.2d at 988.
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cant's age, as in the two previously discussed cases. In-
stead, the plaintiffs were American Airlines captains who
wanted to continue working in the position of flight of-
ficer after their sixtieth birthdays.3 8 The court concluded
that sufficient evidence had been presented to justify a
jury verdict that American had established a BFOQ de-
fense. 13 9  The court emphasized that safety factors
weighed heavily in favor of supporting American's policy
of using the flight officer position as a training ground for
future captains. 140
2. The Supreme Court Fails to Resolve the Conflict
In 1985, the United States Supreme Court addressed
the applicability of the BFOQ defense in the airline indus-
try in Trans World Airlines v. Thurston.14 1 Trans World per-
mitted flight engineers to continue working past the age
of sixty but did not automatically allow captains to trans-
fer to flight engineer status after they were forced to dis-
continue piloting due to the FAA Age Sixty Rule. 42  A
pilot approaching the age of sixty could "bid" for a posi-
tion as flight engineer, but if no vacancy occurred before
138 Id. at 991.
,59 Id. at 994. The court held that:
[T]here was evidence to support the jury's verdict in favor of Ameri-
can. First, American presented evidence that it used the third crew
position to train future pilots and that the possibility existed that so
many ex-captains would become flight officers that the training posi-
tion would be blocked and that safety would possibly be endan-
gered. Second, American presented two expert witnesses who
testified that in their opinion the presence of senior ex-captains in
the position of third crew member created a possible hazardous situ-
ation, and that it was impossible to determine which ex-captains
would pose a safety hazard.
Id. (footnote omitted).
140 Id. at 992-93. The court noted that in adopting the BFOQ defense, Con-
gress had extensively questioned a New York government official on the applica-
bility of New York's BFOQ defense, and he stated that "[c]onsideration may be
given to age as a bona fide occupational qualification.., where age is a bona fide
factor in an apprentice training or on-the-job training program of long duration."
Id.
141 469 U.S. 111 (1985).
142 Id. at 115-17; see supra notes 100-109 for a discussion of the FAA Age Sixty
Rule.
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his sixtieth birthday he was forced to retire. 4 3  Con-
versely, a pilot who was displaced for any reason other
than age, such as medical disability, did not have to resort
to the bidding system but instead was permitted to
"bump" a less senior flight engineer. 44
The Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals' decision that Trans World Airlines' transfer
policy was illegally discriminating on the basis of age
against the pilots who could not find a vacant flight engi-
neer position. 145  The Court concluded that the BFOQ
defense to such discrimination did not apply because "age
under 60 is not a BFOQ for the position of flight engi-
neer."' 146 The Court did not address, however, the ques-
tion of whether age is a BFOQ for the flight engineer
position when that position is consistently used as the first
step in a training program of which the ultimate goal is
captaincy. In fact, the Court specifically noted that the
airline employed a great number of persons in the flight
engineer position who were over sixty years old and could
not effectively make such an argument. 47 Consequently,
Trans World appears to be distinguishable from Murnane
and Johnson.
The Supreme Court again wrestled with the issue of
'43 Trans World, 469 U.S. at 116. The court noted that under Trans World's
bidding process:
[A] captain may remain with the airline only if he has been able to
obtain "flight engineer status" through the bidding procedures out-
lined in the collective-bargaining agreement. These procedures re-
quire a captain, prior to his 60th birthday, to submit a "standing
bid" for the position of flight engineer. When a vacancy occurs, it is
assigned to the most senior captain with a standing bid. If no va-
cancy occurs prior to his 60th birthday, or if he lacks sufficient sen-
iority to bid successfully for those vacancies that do occur, the
captain is retired.
Id. (footnote omitted).
144 Id. at 116-17 (noting that a captain who was medically disabled could auto-
matically displace a flight engineer with less seniority, and his ability to do this did
not depend upon the availability of a vacancy).
14- Id. at 121-24.
146 Id. at 123.
1 Id. at 121 n.18 (noting that the airline had at least 148 persons employed in
the capacity of flight engineer who were over the age of sixty).
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BFOQ defenses in the airline industry in Western Airlines,
Inc. v. Criswell, '48 and its decision again did not resolve the
extent to which the BFOQ defense is applicable in the air-
line industry. In this case, Western had imposed a
mandatory retirement plan that required flight engineers
as well as pilots to retire at age sixty.1 49 Consequently,
pilots forced to retire at sixty were not permitted to down-
grade to the position of flight engineer because flight en-
gineers were forced to retire at the same time.15 0  The
airline attempted to justify this policy by arguing that the
same considerations that established age sixty as a BFOQ
for pilots also apply to flight engineers.'15
Thus, Western was essentially arguing that the FAA
Age Sixty Rule 52 should extend to all members of the
cockpit crew, and not just to the senior pilots, for safety
reasons.5 5 Thejury rejected this argument, and Western
appealed on the grounds that the jury instructions did not
adequately emphasize the airline's concern for the safety
of its passengers.5 4  The Supreme Court affirmed the
court of appeal's rejection of this argument, noting that
the standard for establishing a BFOQwas "reasonable ne-
cessity" and that this adequately permitted evaluations of
safety concerns. 55 Despite the extra safety considerations
148 472 U.S. 400, 405 (1985).
149 Id.
I5 Id. Western denied the requests of pilots approaching age sixty for reassign-
ment as flight engineers, "ostensibly on the ground that [thel employees were
members of the company's retirement plan which required all crew members to
retire at age sixty". Id.
,5, Id. at 418. Western attempted to convince the Court that "flight engineers
must meet the same stringent qualifications as pilots" and consequently it was
"quite logical to extend to flight engineers the FAA's age-60 retirement rule for
pilots". Id.
152 For a discussion of the FAA Age Sixty rule, see supra notes 100-109 and
accompanying text.
,'"s Western Airlines, 472 U.S. at 406. Western argued that all crew members
should be forced to retire at sixty because "with advancing age the likelihood of
onset of disease increases and . . . in persons over age sixty it could not be pre-
dicted whether and when such disease would occur". Id.
,54 Id. at 408.
1 Id. at 419. In rejecting Western's argument that the instructions did not
adequately emphasize the airline's concern for public safety, the Court concluded
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required of the airline industry, Western had not estab-
lished that an age under sixty was reasonably necessary to
the particular job of flight engineer. 56
As in Trans World, however, the idea of a three-tiered
training program, which seemed to be of overwhelming
importance in Murnane and Johnson, does not appear to
have been emphasized by Western. Consequently, the
Supreme Court's position on a BFOQ defense is still un-
clear when the airline consistently uses the flight engineer
position as a training ground for its future pilots.
IV. CONCLUSION
The effects of age discrimination on the individual can
be devastating, and this is especially true when the partic-
ular individual is a competent pilot. A pilot's ability to
combat the effects of age discrimination may be less than
the ability of persons in other occupations since discrimi-
nation in the airline industry is potentially justified due to
safety concerns. The overriding concern in the airline in-
dustry for public safety might justify such discrimination
in situations when it would ordinarily be considered
reprehensible.
The courts have not been clear regarding which factors
justify the use of this defense in the airline industry. If the
that the standard required for a BFOQ did not ignore public safety
considerations:
When an employer establishes that a job qualification has been care-
fully formulated to respond to documented concerns for public
safety, it will not be overly burdensome to persuade a trier of fact
that the qualification is "reasonably neccessary" to safe operation of
the business. The uncertainty implicit in the concept of managing
safety risks always makes it "reasonably necessary" to err on the side
of caution in a close case. The employer cannot be expected to es-
tablish the risk of an airline accident "to a certainty, for certainty
would require running the risk until a tragic accident would prove
that the judgment was sound". When the employer's argument has
a credible basis in the record, it is difficult to believe that ajury of lay
persons - many of whom no doubt have flown or could expect to fly
on commercial air carriers - would not defer in a close case to the
airline's judgment.
Id. at 419-20 (footnote and citation omitted).
156 Id. at 420.
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pilot can prove that the airline is discriminating merely for
economic reasons or to avoid a perceived increase in the
chance of medical emergencies in flight, then the airline
will probably be denied the BFOQ defense. In these situ-
ations, an airline's discrimination on the basis of age may
be unlawful. If the airline can prove that it discriminates
in hiring on the basis of age as the result of a valid train-
ing program designed to increase pilot experience and ex-
pertise, then the pilot may be required to change careers.
Although this is certainly unfortunate for the particular
pilot involved, the safety interests of the numerous pas-
sengers on board apparently outweigh his right to enjoy
his chosen livelihood for as long as he may wish.
Although the FAA Age Sixty Rule is not conclusive evi-
dence of a BFOQ, it does appear to be an integral factor
in the determination since it imposes a maximum age
limit for pilots around which a valid discriminatory train-
ing program may be established. With the advance of
medical technology, the Age Sixty Rule may become in-
creasingly outdated and obsolete. Even today, courts
have begun to question its continued validity. The air-
lines may be required to make individual determinations
regarding a pilot's capacity to remain in that position after
the age of sixty, instead of retaining a blanket rule man-
dating retirement. Consequently, pilots wishing to con-
tinue commercial piloting after reaching the age of sixty
may have a glimmer of hope, even where the airline's dis-
crimination is part of a training program designed to in-
crease safety in the skies.
1989] 579

Current Literature

